Gen. Petraeus gave his report to Congress today. Before uttering a single word, however, there was this:

MoveOn.org’s ad in the New York Times.

Let’s dissect the MoveOn.org ad, shall we?

General Petraeus is a military man constantly at war with the facts. In 2004, just before the election, he said there was “tangible progress“ in Iraq and that “Iraqi leaders are stepping forward.”
Washington Post, “Battling for Iraq,” by David H. Petraeus. 9/26/04 (see below)

In 2004, things couldn’t have been much worse. The battles for Fallujah were already underway. Abu Ghraib was about to rear its ugly head. On the other hand, there was some good news - the United States no longer had direct control over the government of Iraq, handing it off to an interim government that would be replaced with elections the next year. In order for things to improve from 2004 on (and they most certainly have), Gen. Petraeus had to be on to something.
even he admits that there’s too much violence. Continuing on…

Every independent report on the ground situation in Iraq shows that the surge strategy has failed.
GAO report, 9/4/07
NIE report, 8/23/07
Jones report, CSIS, 9/6/07

1. If you take a look at the GAO report, you’ll notice that civilian attacks do drop, starting in October 2006 - this is consistent with Petraeus’ report, though GAO reports a less steep drop in civilian deaths. Also note that Petraeus’ report goes through to August, whereas the GAO report only has data up to July. Furthermore, if you look at the GAO report, you’ll find that attacks of all kinds drop rather steeply in June 2007. That would be the start of the surge.

2. The NIE report begins with the title, “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive”. This would be contrary to MoveOn.org’s assessment that the NIE report supports the statement that “the surge strategy has failed”. That said, you can’t judge a book by its cover. So, let’s take a quote from the NIE:

There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions. (emphasis not mine)

So, in short, attack levels fell when the surge began (nine weeks before the report came out), but violence is still high. Interestingly, Gen. Petraeus doesn’t disagree with this, stating in his original report:

To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Ninevah Province, for example, has been much more up and down, until a recent decline, and the same is true in Sala ad Din Province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq – a steady decline of incidents in the past three months – is still quite significant.

The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past 5 months,
from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month. While this
trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high profile attacks is still too high,
and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks.

So, there’s agreement there.

3. The Jones report does not contradict the NIE or GAO reports - it also reports that the situation is improving, that the Iraqi Security Forces are starting to make headway, and that they’re not ready to assume the lead in Iraqi security yet. Interestingly, this is also what Gen. Petraeus reports:

As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.

Compare this to the Jones report:

The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both their readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq.

[…]

While severely deficient in combat support and combat service support capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the Army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infastructures that lead to the successful formation of a national defense capability. The Commission concurs with the view expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from Coalition forces. In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilites independently over the next 12-18 months.

Gen. Petraues’ report does not contradict that timeline - in fact, he refuses to speculate on when that might occur.

Moving on… next up, the MoveOn.org ad has this to say:

Yet the General claims a reduction in violence. That’s because, according to the New York Times, the Pentagon has adopted a bizarre formula for keeping tabs on violence. For example, deaths by car bombs don’t count.
“Time to Take a Stand,” by Paul Krugman. 9/7/07

Unfortunately, I don’t have a TimesSelect membership, and I’m not about to pay for one now. That said, as I mentioned earlier, the GAO, NIE, and Jones report all indicate similar drops in violence as that reported by Gen. Petraeus.

Next up…

The Washington Post reported that assassinations only count if you’re shot in the back of the head — not the front.
“Experts Doubt Drop in Violence in Iraq,” by Karen DeYoung. 9/6/07

First, Gen. Petraeus declared the drop in “ethno-sectarian” deaths to be 55%, not 75%. In Baghdad, he reports a higher decrease of 80% since December, which may be what MoveOn.org was responding to. However, Gen. Petraeus reports that total civilian deaths, less natural causes, went down by 45% since December, a number which the MoveOn.org ad doesn’t dispute. Furthermore, from the Washington Post article:

Senior U.S. officers in Baghdad disputed the accuracy and conclusions of the largely negative GAO report, which they said had adopted a flawed counting methodology used by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Many of those conclusions were also reflected in last month’s pessimistic National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

So, in short, MoveOn.org cited a source that contradicts its preceding sources!

Continuing on…

According to news reports, there have been more civilian deaths and more American soldier deaths in the past three months than in any other summer we’ve been there.
The Associated Press, “Violence Appears to Be Shifting from Baghdad.” 8/25/07
National Public Radio, “Statistics the Weapon of Choice in Surge Debate,” by Guy Raz. 9/6/07
Associated Press, “Key Figures About Iraq Since the War Began in 2003.” 9/5/07

Let’s start with the first AP article:

The AP tracking includes Iraqi civilians, government officials, police and security forces killed in attacks such as gunfights and bombings, which are frequently blamed on Sunni suicide strikes. It also includes execution-style killings — largely the work of Shiite death squads.

In other words, this article uses ISF casualties as civilian deaths. Nice. It then says they’re on the rise. Of course they are - that’s because the ISF is doing more of the fighting. Is that true? Who knows? The important thing is that, as long as you count military casualties as civilian casualties, you’re going to be able to draw really bad conclusions. For example, I could claim that Iraqi insurgents have inflicted over 3,000 American civilian casualties, and that’s why we need to fight there - we must stop them from killing our people! Oh, did I mention they were members of the Armed Forces, and they’re over there suppressing a civil war? Why, does it matter? They’re killing thousands of our people!

Jesus.

Next, the NPR article:

The military measures stability in Iraq by looking at total attacks daily — attacks on U.S. troops, Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians. The Pentagon says total daily attacks are now at a one-year low. But last year was the deadliest for Iraqis since the invasion, so the comparison, says retired Army Col. Paul Hughes, is somewhat misleading.

No it’s not. The point of the surge was to decrease violence. It’s lower than last year. Sounds good.

“Even with the security that’s improved in the Baghdad region,” Hughes says, “they are still not getting the electricity and the water that city’s citizens need.”

Before the war, Baghdad had round-the-clock electricity. Today, more than four years since the invasion, the city averages about six hours of electricity a day.

This, of course, does not touch on how much electricity was being received in other parts of Iraq prior to the war, nor that there was no insurgency before we invaded Iraq because Saddam had the rather interesting knack of either gassing them or by wiping out their food supply.

Then comes the gem of the NPR article:

And then there’s the issue of Anbar province. Both the White House and the Pentagon have attributed the changes in Anbar to the surge strategy. But several military advisers who worked in Iraq until late last year have said that is simply not true. MacGregor says that the increasing cooperation between U.S. forces and Sunni tribes in Anbar started more than 18 months ago, long before the “surge.”

“And they were done on the initiative of the Marines and the Navy who looked at Anbar and said, “There’s gotta be a better way to do business here,” he says.

So, things were improving before the surge? Cool!

Finally, the third article:

_Prewar nationwide: 3,958 megawatts. Hours per day (estimated): four to eight.

_Aug. 14, 2007, nationwide: 4,110 megawatts. Hours per day: 10

Remember how I asked about the power situation for the rest of Iraq? Well, does this answer that question?

WATER:

_Prewar: 12.9 million people had potable water.

_July 13, 2007: 15.4 million people have potable water.

SEWERAGE:

_Prewar: 6.2 million people served.

_July 13, 2007: 11.3 million people served.

Of course, it wouldn’t have been so bad if it weren’t for the sanctions… I mean, it’s not like it was Saddam’s fault that all of Iraq’s resources went to its capital or anything. Of course not.

*************

Okay, I’d continue dissecting this, but, frankly, MoveOn.org did a wonderful job of putting enough sources in their article to keep me from dissecting them all in a timely fashion. As it is, I’ve spent far more time on this than I should have. If someone wants to carry the torch and continue the dissection, more power to them. Either way, though, understand this:

MoveOn.org was wrong about what Petraeus had to say. It was even wrong about what its own sources had to say, at least the ones that I looked at, and picked contradictory sources to make its argument. If that isn’t proof of some “book cooking”, I don’t know what is.